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INTRODUCTION
It is an old story, oft-related, that the False Claims Act (FCA) arose in
response to fraud perpetrated against the government in the Civil War by the
Union military.1 Acknowledging the fact that the Federal Treasury was being
depleted by unscrupulous profiteers submitting claims for work either never
done or only partially done, Congress took advantage of an age-old motivator:

* Clinical Associate Professor at the Columbus School of Law at the Catholic University
of America. The author would like to thank his colleagues for their assistance with this
article: Kathryn Kelly, Mary Leary, Sarah Duggin, Lisa Everhart, Marshall Breger, Robert
Destro, Mark Rienzi, Suzette Malveaux, Megan LaBelle, Leah Wortham, and Dean George
Garvey. He would also like to thank James M. Becker, Esquire, of Buchanan, Ingersoll &
Rooney, for his insights.
1. 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2006); e.g. J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and
the English Eradication of Qui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 555–56 (2000)
(explaining that the FCA was enacted during the Civil War in response to procurement
fraud by the Union military).
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bounty.2 Regardless of the motivation, be it profiteering, revenge, or otherwise,
as long as the government was alerted to fraud, the whistleblower could
participate in the recovery.
Whistleblowing has a long and storied history in Anglo-American
jurisprudence, stretching back to medieval times, and it has found both friends
and foes along the way.3 Attempts to reign in its powers, followed by attempts
to expand its reach, are characteristically part of the story.4
Recently, the FCA was amended by an even more contentious Act: the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA). In a five-word
alteration, the PPACA has greatly expanded the reach of the statute, in terms of
how a case must be proven, who has to prove it, and what circumstances, if any,
will bar the proceeding from going forward.5 Additionally, new constitutional
and policy concerns stem from the increased governmental discretion in
deciding which suits can and cannot proceed.6 The problems resulting from
the government’s expanded discretion go to the very nature of qui tam actions
themselves.7
This article will address the constitutionality of the PPACA’s expansion of
the FCA and will argue that the FCA, which was one of the latest informer
statutes in Anglo-American jurisprudence, is no longer an informer statute at
all. It will include a historical discussion of the constitutionality of the FCA in
Part II,8 and an in-depth discussion of the PPACA amendments to the FCA in
Part III.9 Part IV explains why the PPACA changes to the FCA have transformed
the nature of the act from an informer’s statute, a type of legislation granted
Article III standing by the Supreme Court, to a private attorney general statute,

2.
See §§ 3729-3733 (explaining that the FCA originally imposed a $2,000 penalty
for each violation, plus a penalty equivalent to the double the government’s damages, to
which the informer was entitled to half of the recovery).
3.
See, e.g., Jon Knight, Patrolling the Unfriendly Skies: Patrolling Whistleblowers
Through Expanded Jurisdiction, 20 FED. CIR. L. REV. 281 (2010).
4.
Id..
5.
Patient Protection and Affordable Health Care Act of 2010 (PPACA), Pub.
L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 782 (2010) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 42
U.S.C.). See Beverly Cohen, Kaboom! The Explosion of Qui Tam False Claims Under the
Health Reform Law, 116 PENN ST. L. REV. 77 (2011); Brian Santo, The False Claims Act:
Analysis of the Recently Expanded Legislation on Qui Tam Actions and Related Impact
on Whistleblowers (Jul. 2010), http://www.americanbar.org/newsletter/publications/
aba_health_resource_home/Volume6_SE2_Santo.html#_ftnref2.
6.
See 42 U.S.C. § 1303(j)(2), 124 Stat. 901-02 (2010) (codified at 31 U.S.C. §
3730(e)(4)).
7.
See Cohen, supra note 5.
8.
See infra Part II.
9.
See infra Part III.
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which is not.10 Part V sets forth the Article II Appointments clause argument
against the newly-amended FCA,11 and Part VI sets out the final Take Care
Clause argument that arises after the aforementioned changes.12 Lastly, Part VII
explores the policy problems that raise grave concerns regarding the PPACA
amendments to the FCA.13
II.

HISTORY OF QUI TAM ACTIONS

A.

Great Britain: For King and Self

The essence of qui tam actions was captured in King Wihtred of Kent’s
late seventh-century statute: “If a freeman works during the forbidden time
[between sunset on Saturday evening and sunset on Sunday evening], he shall
forfeit his healsfang, and the man who informs against him shall have half the
fine, and [the profits arising from] the labour.”14 This declaration, and countless
others, derive their power not so much from the force of sovereign declaration,
but from the worth of the information provided.15 Indeed, the entire point
of the qui tam action is to enhance enforcement, which is accomplished by
incentivizing third parties to report legal transgressions.16 Historically, the
informer was only required to bring the kind of news that the law deemed
worthy of reward.17 The power of the bounty insured the force of the law,
giving it teeth.

10.
See infra Part IV.
11.
See infra Part V (building upon the traditional arguments based on the same and
explains how they have been exacerbated by the PPACA changes).
12.
See infra Part VI.
13.
See infra Part VII (including a potential for increased “parasitic actions,” i.e.,
those that seek part of the reward without earning part of its victory; incentives and
disincentives to bringing FCA actions; inherent procedural problems for both the FCA
relator and FCA defendant that will likely present themselves due to the unpredictability
of how the public disclosure bar will be employed; negative impacts on resources and
recoveries; and unintended equitable and professional consequences).
14.
Beck, supra note 1, at 567 (citing THE LAWS OF THE EARLIEST ENGLISH KINGS
3, 27 (F.L. Attenborough ed. & trans., 1963)). “Healsfang” was a fine to avoid punishment.
Id. Professor Beck explains that English qui tam law had its predecessors in Roman law,
where informers were given a right to a portion of recoveries made despite their own
personal lack of injury. Id. at 565, n.124.
15.
See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV. R. 40785, QUI TAM: THE FALSE
CLAIMS ACT AND RELATED FEDERAL STATUTES 2 (2009) (describing how a qui tam statute
could be seen as a way to make money either by reward or blackmail).
16.
Id.
17.
See generally Beck, supra note 1, at 565-74 (detailing the various qui tam
regulations that were enforced using informer provisions).
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Informer statutes affected a number of areas of commerce, ranging from
wool exports to silk imports, from wage hikes to beer production, from silver
gilding to hide tanning.18 They even affected the practice of law.19 Although
the power of informer statutes proved destructive to communal bonds, turning
neighbor against neighbor, this problem did not quell the passage of such
legislation.20 Worse, Professional informers cropped up to take advantage of
the practice, venturing so far as to regulate clerical orthodoxy and to enforce
ecclesiastical strictures.21 While the informer himself was typically held in low
estate, lawmakers kept the statutes on the books to use the power of greed as
a means to catch scofflaws. Professor J. Randy Beck describes the general
opinion of informers, characterized by no less eminent a source than Sir
Edward Coke:
In his Institutes of the Laws of England, Sir Coke listed ‘the
vexatious informer’ as one among several ‘viperous Vermin’
preying upon the Church and the Commonwealth. Indeed,
informers harassed and impoverished citizens, particularly
those in the lower classes, ‘for malice or private ends, [but]
never for love of Justice.’
Sir Coke’s attitude toward informers was similar to the
opinion expressed by the Court of Star Chamber.22 Sir John
Stafford initiated an action as a common informer, perhaps
lured by the potential for easy money.23 Sir Stafford ‘was
greatly blamed by the court that [despite] being so worthy
a gentleman . . . he would stoop to so base an office as to

18.
See id. at 565, n.151-56.
19.
Id. at 565 n.151.
20.
Id. at 574 n.172. See also DOYLE, supra note 15, at 2 (quoting IV Holdsworth, A
History of English Law 356 (1903): “[Qui tam Actions] brought with them . . . unintended
consequences. They gave rise to a class of bounty hunters who unscrupulously exploited
weaknesses in the system. ‘Old Statutes which had been forgotten were unearthed and
used as means to gratify ill-will. Litigation was stirred up simply in order that the informer
might compound [i.e., settle] for a sum of money. Threats to sue were easy means of
levying blackmail.”).
21.
See Beck, supra note 1, at 576-77 (2000) (pointing out that qui tam statutes
during Henry VIII’s reign aimed to regulate the clergy).
22.
Id.
23.
Id.
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be an informer, who albeit they be necessary in every wellgoverned state, yet for the most part they are of the meaner
and worst [sort].’24
Indeed, the informer was notoriously powerful in demanding unlicensed
settlements, procuring inconvenient venues, and casting wide nets to capture
defendants for the most technical of offenses.25 After a long run, reforms in the
area beginning during the reign of the Tudors gradually curbed the abuses,26
and the actions were ultimately abolished centuries later, under the Common
Informers Act of 1951.27
B.

American Actions

Although the qui tam story has ended in England, it is far from over here
in America. In fact, the action’s trajectory has taken a parallel path to that
of Great Britain.28 Colonial laws were rife with rewards for informers who
reported on street peddling, illegal oyster gathering, out-of-season mackerel
fishing, and fraudulent bread trading, among other prohibited acts.29 Informer
statutes were just as common after independence had been won from Great
Britain, as evidenced by such cases as United States v. Simms30 and Brown v.
United States.31
In response to fraud perpetrated against the Union Army, including the
sale and resale of the same string of horses and the delivery of boxes full
of sawdust instead of muskets,32 Senator Jacob M. Howard stated the logic
behind the FCA:

24.
Id. (citations omitted). It is said that “Coke’s influence causes a marked decline
in the statutory recognition and encouragement of common informers.” Gerald Hurst, The
Common Informer, 147 CONTEMP. REV. 189–90 (1935). In words that resonate with the
Appointments Clause argument traditionally leveled against qui tam actions in this country,
Coke also said: “The King cannot commit the sword of his justice or the oil of his mercy
concerning any penal statute to any subject.” Id.
25.
Id.
26.
The reign of George III saw a resurgence in the popularity of informer actions,
which had fallen into disfavor, particularly with regard to Sunday observances, as required
by the Lord’s Day Observance Act. See W. W. HARDWICKE, SUNDAY OBSERVANCE: IT’S
ORIGIN AND MEANING 51 (1906).
27.
14 & 15 Geo. VI, ch. 39, sched. (1951).
28.
See United States ex rel. Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 1084,
1085 (C.D. Cal.1989) (stating that the qui tam traditions of England have followed the
law’s development in the United States).
29.
DOYLE, supra note 15, at nn.5, 14.
30.
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 252 (1803).
31.
12 U.S. (8 Cranch) 110 (1814).
32.
33 Cong. Globe 952-960 (1863).
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The effect of them is simply to hold out to a confederate a strong
temptation to betray his coconspirator, and bring him to justice. The
bill offers, in short, a reward to the informer who comes into court
and betrays his coconspirator, if he be such; but it is not confined to
that class . . . . In short, sir, I have based the fourth, fifth, sixth, and
seventh sections upon the old-fashion idea of hold out a temptation,
and ‘setting a rogue to catch a rogue,’ which is the safest and most
expeditious way I have ever discovered of bringing rogues to justice.33
The action remained unchanged from that time until 1943, when an attempt
to repeal the FCA was instituted at the urging of then Attorney General,
Francis Biddle.34 The same kind of mischief that was at the heart of medieval
and renaissance criticisms of informer statutes can be heard in Biddle’s call
for an abolition of an informer’s claim: “[i]nformers’ suits have become mere
parasitical actions, occasionally brought only after law-enforcement officers
have investigated and prosecuted persons guilty of violations of law and solely
because of the hope of large rewards.”35
Although both the House and Senate were sympathetic to the Attorney
General Biddle’s plea and passed bills to repeal the statute, the movement came
to a sudden and unexpected halt in 1943.36 This change of events was due to the
Supreme Court’s decision in United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess.37 An FCA
action concerning a collusive bidding scheme, Hess was ruled upon within
five short months of Attorney General Biddle’s plea. One of the respondent’s
primary arguments was that the petitioner should be barred from bringing
the action because he had based his information solely on the respondent’s
previous indictment, and therefore had contributed no new information by way
of his own investigation.38 Marcus involved exactly the kind of “parasitical”
action Biddle had complained of in his letter.
33.
DOYLE, supra note 15, at 5 (quoting remarks of Senator Howard, 33 Cong. Globe
952-960 (1863)). In another famous iteration of the theory behind the act, Justice Deady of
the U.S. District Court for the District of Oregon said: “[O]ne of the least expensive and
most effective means of preventing frauds on the treasury is to make the perpetrators of
them liable to actions by private persons acting, if you please, under the strong stimulus of
personal ill will or the hope of gain. Prosecutions conducted by such means compare with
the ordinary methods as the enterprising privateer does to the slow-going public vessel.”
U.S. v. Griswold. 24 F. 361, 365 (D.Or. 1885).
34.
See Beck, supra note 1, at 558 (informing that Attorney General Biddle sent a
letter to Congress and that, in response, Congress voted to repeal FCA qui tam provisions).
35.
S. Rep. No. 77–1708, at 2 (1942); H. Rep. No. 78–263 at 2 (1943).
36.
Beck, supra note 1, at 558 (describing how the bill aiming to eliminate FCA qui
tam provisions met with strong opposition and eventually was discarded for a compromise
legislation that narrowed but did not eliminate qui tam provisions).
37.
317 U.S. 537 (1943) (reversing the lower court’s holding as the narrow
interpretation disallows any criminal proceeding to be brought against respondents, thus
immaterializing qui tam actions).
38.
Id. (“the force of these considerations is entirely directed at what the government
thinks Congress should have done rather than at what it did”).
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However, in delivering the opinion of the Court, Justice Black frustrated
Biddle’s objective and found that the contentions of the respondents and the
government lacked support in both statute’s language and legislative history.39
Justice Black justified his decision to ignore Attorney General Biddle’s plea
on the grounds that “[t]he Senate sponsor of the bill explicitly pointed out
that he was not offering a plan aimed solely at rewarding the conspirator who
betrays his fellows, but that even a district attorney, who would presumably
gain all knowledge of a fraud from his official position, might sue as the
informer.”40 Further, Congress could have required a specific amount of “new
information” to be produced by the informant but did not do so.41 Therefore,
the respondent’s complaints about bad policy were being made before the
wrong forum. Although conditions were different after the Act was passed in
1863, the statute remained unchanged42 and the Court would not presume to
change it for the legislature. In a worrisome aside, Justice Black even seemed
to include the expense that the petitioner had risked in maintaining the suit as
a justification for his right to bring the action, regardless of whether he had
provided new information or not.43
The idea that the informer statute allowed a petitioner to bring an action
regardless of whether he contributed anything to the case inspired a fullthroated dissent from Justice Jackson. He argued that:
[T]here is nothing in the text or history of this statute which
indicates to me that Congress intended to enrich a mere busybody
who copies a Government’s indictment as his own complaint and
who brings to light no frauds not already disclosed and no injury
the Treasury not already in the process of vindication.44

39.
Id. at 547 (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 37th Cong., 3d Sess. 955-56 (1863) (alteration
in original).
40.
Id.
41.
Id. at n.9 (interpreting that the lack of language requiring a large amount of
information essentially mean that Congress did not intend to negate rewards to those
informants who offered only a small amount of information).
42.
Id. (suggesting that Congress’ decision not to set forth the required amount of
new information necessary in order to receive a reward allows thesimplest of informants to
earn a a reward).
43.
Id. at 545–46. See James T. Blanch, The Constitutionality of the False Claims
Act’s Qui Tam Provision, 16 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 701, 713–14 (1993). The argument
that the qui tam relator has standing because he has invested an interest in the outcome has
been roundly dismissed. The Supreme Court rejected it in Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v.
United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 765 (2000). 529 U.S. at 765 (holding that the
United States’ injury conferred standing on relator to bring qui tam civil action under FCA
and the state was not a “person” under qui tam liability). See discussion in Part III infra.
44.
Hess, 317 U.S. at 558.
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Justice Jackson was sure that it was never Congress’ intent to authorize
this misuse of the statute. If that statute had, in fact, authorized this abusive
proceeding ever since 1863, then “the legal profession of the United States has
been strangely unresponsive to a Congressional proffer of windfall income.”45
Justice Jackson called upon Congress to intervene and stop the apparent abuse
and corruption created by the statute’s misuse.46 Justice Jackson went on to
make several other points contradicting the majority’s logic, and he proved
prescient in his remark that only Congress could intervene to prevent the
consequences that the Marcus decision would bring about.47 Congress quickly
passed the 1943 amendments to the FCA, which instituted the public disclosure
bar and effectively overruled the case.48
In addition to Justice Jackson’s stated arguments against the majority’s
view in Marcus, other arguments highlight the problem created by permitting
informer statutes to require no information. First, Justice Black’s explanation
of Senator Howard’s remarks from the floor debate in 1863 does not take the
statement in the proper context. Senator Howard is not using his “district
attorney” example to contend that “new” information is unnecessary, but
to make it clear that the class of those who may be informers is not limited
to co-conspirators that are in league with the defendant. Rather, Senator
Howard’s point is that someone outside the class of conspirators—such as the
district attorney—could bring the suit. 49 However, that some kind of useful
information must be brought by the petitioner—district attorney or not—is
understood as a condition to that suit.

45.
Id. at 559.
46.
Id. at 559 (stating that Congress should be clearer with regard toabout its
legislative intent).
47.
Justice Jackson feared the government’s loss of control over prosecution and
the possibility of collusion between a relator and the defendant. Id. at 561. The latter
possibility has always been a problem with qui tam actions. See Beck, supra note 1, at
551–52, 574 (explaining how potential qui tam defendants learned how to turn the system
of private prosecution to their advantage as the outcome in a quit tam suit was binding on
the government).
48.
See Act of Dec. 23, 1943, ch. 377, 57 Stat. 608 (1943) (codified as amended
at 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2006)). After the Marcus decision, some opposition arose to an
outright repeal of the action. See DOYLE, supra note 15 at 2; Beck, supra note 1, at 7. The
compromise required the relator to disclose his evidence to the government and wait sixty
days for an intervention decision, forbade claims based on information already possessed
by the government, and reduced the relator’s share of the recovery. Beck, supra note 1, at
357 & nn.45–47.
49. That the district attorney could do such a thing at the time is only a reflection
of the state of the justice system in the nineteenth century. Justice Jackson complained
along these lines, criticizing Justice Black’s interpretation of Senator Howard’s words.
Justice Jackson said the senator’s remarks about the district attorney had to be placed in the
context of a nation that did not yet have a Department of Justice, FBI, etc. See Marcus v.
Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 560 (1943).
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The second point against Justice Black’s interpretation follows from the
first: that there can be no meaningful distinction between “information”
and “new information” in an informer statute. For the informer statute to
incentivize reports of legal transgressions, the petitioner must bring useful
information; otherwise, the word “information” is meaningless, as the relation
of old news informs the government of nothing. As Jackson implies, without
useful information that enhances what the government already knows, the
law ceases to be a reformer statute altogether and becomes a private attorney
general statute entitling the relator to a windfall profit. In so doing, it runs into
the Appointments Clause problems that have historically been part of the qui
tam criticisms, which will be discussed below.
The history of informer statutes from England to America and down to
Marcus was based on the qui tam relator relaying information, not repeating
information already possessed. If that were the case, qui tam actions would
not be “informer” statutes, but “repeater” statutes. This is an important point,
as it goes to the very nature of how informer statutes have been understood.
In fact, the 1943 Amendments to the FCA, as well as the subsequent 1986
Amendments, both focused on enhancing the statute’s power by way of
making sure that useful information is provided.50 While the 1943 amendments
excluded parasitic information, the 1986 amendments reinvigorated the statute
by expanding the definition of false claims and refining the jurisdictional
bar, along with other changes.51 However, the law was intended as, and has
been applied as, an informer statute—a means to gain information about
legal transgressions that might not otherwise be known.52 The tenuous

50.
Act of Dec. 23, 1943, ch. 377, 57 Stat. 608 (1943) (codified as amended
at 31 U.S.C. § 3730 (2006)); False Claims Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-562, 100 Stat.
3153 (codified as amended at 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733 (2006)). The Fraud Enforcement
and Recovery Act of 2009 (“FERA”) also amended the FCA in a variety of ways that
expanded liability and enforcement provisions, but not in ways directly relevant to the
constitutional concerns discussed in this part. For a discussion of FERA’s impact on the
FCA, see generally 1 JOHN T. BOESE, CIVIL FALSE CLAIMS AND QUI TAM ACTIONS § 1.09
(4th ed. 2009).
51.
See supra, Part II. The legislative history of the 1986 amendments reveal that
the knowledge of fraud provides a constructive role to the action, and serves as the reason
behind the qui tam actions. The law was meant to “deputize ready and able people who
have knowledge of fraud against the government to play an active and constructive role
through their counsel to bring to justice those contractors who overcharge the government.”
132 CONG. REC. H9388 (daily ed. Oct. 8, 1986) (statement of Rep. Berman); the 1986
Amendments’ legislative history also includes this statement, relative to relator information:
“Detecting fraud is usually very difficult without the cooperation of individuals who are
either close observers or otherwise involved in the fraudulent activity.” S. REP. NO.99–345
(2d Sess. 1986) reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. § 5266 (1986) (emphasis added).
52.
See DOYLE, supra note 15; Beck supra note 1, at 567 (indicating that numerous
qui tam statutes were enforced if the informer provided information to the authorities about
the specific crime indicated in the statute).
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constitutionality of the amendments has rested on this “informer” nature,
which stretches back to Roman times.53
The “informer” nature is precisely what the PPACA has fundamentally
changed about the FCA. These changes open the statute up to new arguments
based on Article III standing, the Article II Appointments Clause, and the
Article II “Take Care” clause.
III.

PPACA CHANGES TO THE PUBLIC DISCLOSURE BAR

Prior to passage of the PPACA, a qui tam relator could be jurisdictionally
barred from bringing an FCA action under certain circumstances, a result of
changes made through the 1986 amendments. Up until the last year, the statute
read as follows:
(4)(A) No court shall have jurisdiction over an action under this
section based upon the public disclosure of allegations or transactions
in a criminal, civil, or administrative hearing, in a congressional,
administrative, or Government Accounting Office report, hearing,
audit, or investigation, or from the news media, unless the action is
brought by the Attorney General or the person bringing the action is
an original source of the information.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, “original source” means an
individual who has direct and independent knowledge of the
information on which the allegations are based and has voluntarily
provided the information to the Government before filing an action
under this section which is based on the information.54
In short, the section barred suits brought by what Attorney General Biddle
described as “parasitic plaintiffs,” individuals who provide information
already disclosed through an enumerated outlet and cannot show that they are
an original source of that information.55 Subsequent to this latest iteration of
the statute was a long history of litigation over the issues of whether an actual
disclosure occurred, whether the relator’s information was “based upon”

53.
See Beck, supra note 1, at 566 (offering historical background and nature of the
statutes at that time indicating that qui tam statutes arose from the Roman criminal law
system which offered a portion of the defendant’s property as a reward for successful
prosecution of the crime).
54.
31 U.S.C. § 3730(e)(4)(A)-(B) (2) (2006), amended by Pub. L. No. 11-148, 124
Stat. 119 § 10104(j)(2)(4)(A)).
55.
See Beck, supra note 1, at 558 (motivaing both the House of Representatives and
the Senate to vote to repeal the FCA qui tam provisions).
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previously disclosed matter, and whether the depth of the relator’s knowledge
was “direct and independent.”56
However, the PPACA changed the focus of subsequent litigation when it
amended the above stated language. The pertinent part of the statute now reads
as follows:
(4)(A) The court shall dismiss an action or claim under this section,
unless opposed by the Government, if substantially the same
allegations or transactions as alleged in the action or claim were
publicly disclosed—
(i) in a Federal criminal, civil, or administrative hearing in which the
Government or its agent is a party;
(ii) in a congressional, Government Accountability Office, or other
Federal report, hearing, audit, or investigation; or
(iii) from the news media,
unless the action is brought by the Attorney General or the person
bringing the action is an original source of the information.
(B) For purposes of this paragraph, “original source” means an
individual who either
(i) prior to a public disclosure under subsection (e)(4)(a), has
voluntarily disclosed to the Government the information on which
allegations or transactions in a claim are based, or
(ii) who has knowledge that is independent of and materially adds
to the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions, and who has
voluntarily provided the information to the Government before filing
an action under this section.57
The revision of the statute is of great procedural importance, as it reforms
the public disclosure bar from jurisdictional challenge to an affirmative
defense.58 Also, the significance of the addition of the phrase “materially adds
to the publicly disclosed allegations or transactions,” is unclear. Further, the
elimination of state and local administrative, reports, audits and investigations
as sources that could activate the public disclosure bar effectively overruled
a Supreme Court decision handed down contemporaneously with the passage

56.
See Boese, supra note 50 at § 4.02. An examination of the public disclosure bar’s
effect on “unworthy whistleblowers” prior to the PPACA amendments to the FCA, is the
subject of Robert Salcido’s article: Screening Out Unworthy Whistleblower Actions: An
Historical Analysis of the Public Disclosure Jurisdictional Bar to Qui Tam Actions Under
the False Claims Act, 24 PUB. CONT. L.J. 237, 242-43, 260 (1995).
57.
31 U.S.C § 3730(e)(4)(A)-(B) (2010) (emphasis added), amended by Pub. L. No.
111-148, 124 Stat. 119 § 10104 (j)(2)(4)(A)).
58.
The defendant now will bear the proof of whether the information is publicly
disclosed and that the plaintiff does not qualify as an original source, a great sea change in
responsibility.
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of the PPACA.59 However, the focus of this article is on the first highlighted
addition: “unless opposed by the Government.”60
For with that five word alteration, which gives the government a veto over
the public disclosure bar, regardless of the subsequent language in the statute
relating to that bar’s administration, Congress has unintentionally strengthened
the constitutional arguments that have traditionally been leveled at the FCA. A
discussion of each will follow.
IV.

ARTICLE III STANDING

Fairchild v. Hughes,61 a 1922 decision by the Supreme Court, introduced
the standing doctrine. Under this doctrine, actions that did not rise to the level
of Article III “cases and controversies” were thereafter dismissed as nonjusticiable.62 As time passed, a party would no longer be entitled to a hearing
just because it had requested “a court of the United States to declare its legal
rights, and . . . couched that request for forms of relief historically associated
with courts of law in terms that have a familiar ring to those trained in the legal
process.”63
The doctrine came to have three requirements:
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion
of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized,
and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical. Second,
there must be a causal connection between the injury and the conduct
complained of—the injury has to be fairly . . . trace[able] to the
challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . th[e] result [of] the
independent action of some third party not before the court. Third, it
must be “likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury
will be redressed by a favorable decision.
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992) (citations omitted).64

59.
PPACA, Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 § 10104 (j)(2)(4)(A) (2010); see Graham
Cnty. Soil & Water Cons. Dist. v. United States ex rel. Wilson, 130 S.Ct. 1396 (2010).
60.
The legislative history of the amendment is nonexistent. The record simply reads
the amended language into the day’s events without comment or discussion. See PPACA,
Pub. L. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 § 10104 (j)(2)(4)(A) (2010).
61.
258 U.S. 126 (1922).
62.
See id.
63.
Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1974).
64.
The shorthand reference to these requirements is injury in fact, causation, and
redressability.
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Arguments passed back and forth for years over whether a qui tam relator,
who has not been injured in fact, deserves Article III standing.65 Then the
Supreme Court handed down its decision in Vermont Agency of Natural
Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens.66
In Stevens, the relator was a former employee of the Vermont Agency of
Natural Resources, whom the relator alleged had submitted false claims to
the Environmental Protection Agency in violation of the FCA.67 The agency
moved to dismiss the claim on the grounds that a state and/or state agency is
not a “person” under the statute.68
In addressing the issue of whether the relator had Article III standing to
bring the suit, Justice Antonin Scalia, delivering the opinion, rehearsed the
traditional Article III standing doctrine.69 He then pointed out that while the
government had undoubtedly suffered injury itself, “Art. III judicial power
exists only to redress or otherwise to protect against injury to the complaining
party.”70 He then dismissed a set of arguments traditionally made in favor of
qui tam realtor standing.71

65.
Modern analysis of the constitutional arguments for and against qui tam standing,
as well as arguments on other grounds, are included in the following articles: Blanch,
supra note 43; John D. Bressler, The Public Interest and the Unconstitutionality of Private
Prosecutors, 47 ARK. L. REV. 511 (1994); Evan Caminker, The Constitutionality of Qui
Tam Actions, 99 YALE L. J. 341 (1989); Sean Hamera, Lincoln’s Law: Constitutional and
Policy Issues Posed by the Qui Tam Provisions of the False Claims Act, 6 KAN. J.L. & PUB.
POL’Y 89 (1997); Edward A. Hartnett, The Standing of the United States: How Criminal
Prosecutions Show that Standing Doctrine is Looking for Answers in all the Wrong Places,
97 MICH. L. REV. 2239 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein, Standing and the Privatization of Public
Law, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1432 (1988); Steven L. Winter, The Metaphor of Standing and
the Problem of Self-Governance, 40 STAN. L. REV. 1371 (1988).
66.
529 U.S. 765 (2000). Scholarship analyzing standing in the qui tam area postStevens includes: Heather Elliot, Congress’s Inability To Solve Standing Problems, 91
B.U. L. REV. 159 (2011); Michael E. Solimine, Congress, Separation of Powers, and
Standing, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1023 (2009); Pamela H. Bucy, Private Justice and the
Constitution, 69 TENN. L. REV. 939 (2002); Steven L. Winter, What if Justice Scalia Took
History and the Rule of Law Seriously?,12 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 155 (2001).
67.
Stevens, 529 U.S. at 769.
68.
See id. at 772–73.
69.
See id. 771–73 (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environ, 523 U.S. 83,
93–102 (1998); Friends of Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Env. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167,
180–81 (2000); Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990); Simon v. E. Ky. Welfare
Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41 (1976); Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992)).
70.
Id. at 771–72 (citing Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490 (1975)) (emphasis added).
71.
Id. 772–73 (citing Valley Forge Christ. College v. Am. United for Separation of
Church and State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 486 (1982); Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727,
734–35 (1972)).
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First, the argument that the relator is an agent of the United States, entitled to
a bounty, did not suffice to establish an “injury in fact” for Article III standing
purposes.72 The relator has more than the mere right to retain a fee out of the
recovery, but also has an interest in the lawsuit by means of the statute.73
[I]t provides that “[a] person may bring a civil action for a violation of
section 3729 for the person and for the United States Government,” §
3730(b) (emphasis added); gives the relator “the right to continue as
a party to the action” even when the Government itself has assumed
“primary responsibility” for prosecuting it, § 3730(c)(1); entitles the
relator to a hearing before the Government’s voluntary dismissal of
the suit, § 3730(c)(2)(A); and prohibits the Government from settling
the suit over the relator’s objection without a judicial determination
of “fair[ness], adequa[cy] and reasonable[ness],” § 3730(c)(2)(B).74
Indeed, some explanation of standing other than status as a Government agency
is necessary for the relator to retain a portion of the recovery.
Justice Scalia also dismissed the argument referred to obliquely in Marcus,
that the relator has a “concrete private interest in the outcome of [the] suit”
by way of his interest in the potential bounty.75 This interest cannot give rise
to Article III standing either, said the Court, as it is merely a byproduct of
the suit and is not a cognizable injury in fact.76 Although these arguments
were insufficient to establish Article III standing for the qui tam relator, the
Court went on to find an “adequate basis” for standing based on two distinct
arguments: 1) “representational standing,” in that the relator serves as the
assignee of the government’s claim77; and 2) the “long tradition of qui tam
actions in England and the American Colonies.”78
The PPACA amendments to the FCA most directly impact the second
argument for constitutional standing—the one based on historical grounds.
That is because Justice Scalia draws upon early English cases from the
thirteenth century to establish the legacy for the actions, stating that the most
relevant aspect of the analysis before the Court were statutes “that allowed
informers to obtain a portion of the penalty as a bounty for their information,

72.
Id.
73.
Id.
74.
Id.
75.
Marcus at 545–46; Stevens at 772 (citing Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555,
573 (1992)).
76.
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529
U.S. 765, 773 (2000) (citing Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environ., 523 U.S. 83, 102
(2001)).
77.
Stevens at 773–74 (clarifying that the qui tam relator sues as a “partial assignee”
of the United States).
78.
Id.
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even if they had not suffered an injury themselves.”79 The Court went on to
speak of the prevalence of qui tam actions in America around the time of the
Constitution’s framing, particularly characterizing all of them as “informer”
statutes.80 This history, Justice Scalia said:
[was] well nigh conclusive with respect to the question before us
here: whether qui tam actions were “cases and controversies of the
sort traditionally amenable to and resolved by the judicial process.”
When combined with the theoretical justification for relator standing
discussed earlier, it leaves no room for doubt that a qui tam relator
under the FCA has Article III standing.’”81
The importance of the Court’s understanding of the long litany of English
and American qui tam actions as “informer” statutes is central to the standing
argument because the PPACA amendment has fundamentally changed the
nature of the FCA. In short, the FCA, which was one of the latest informer
statutes in Anglo-American jurisprudence, is no longer an informer statute at
all.
As the newly codified government veto over the public disclosure bar:
(4)(A) The court shall dismiss an action or claim under this section,
unless opposed by the Government, if substantially the same
allegations or transactions as alleged in the action or claim were
publicly disclosed . . . 82

79.
Id. at 775 (emphasis added) (citing Statute Prohibiting the Sale of Wares After the
Close of Fair, 5 Edw. III, ch. 5 (1331); Common Informers Act, 14 & 15 Geo. VI, ch. 39,
sched. (1951) (listing informer statutes)). The Court also took note of the many abuses of
the informer statutes that plagued English law.
80.
Stevens at 776-77 (citing, among others, “Act for the Restraining and Punishing
of Privateers and Pirates, 1st Assembly, 4th Sess. (N.Y. 1692), reprinted in 1 Colonial Laws
of New York 279, 281 (1894) (allowing informers to sue for, and receive share of, fine
imposed upon officers who neglect their duty to pursue privateers and pirates)”; “Act of
Mar. 1, 1790, ch. 2, § 3, 1 Stat. 102 (allowing informer to sue for, and receive half of fine
for, failure to file census return); Act of July 5, 1790, ch. 25, § 1, 1 Stat. 129 (extending same
to Rhode Island); Act of July 20, 1790, ch. 29, §§ 1, 4, 1 Stat. 131, 133 (allowing private
individual to sue for, and receive half of fine for, carriage of seamen without contract or
illegal harboring of runaway seamen); Act of July 22, 1790, ch. 33, § 3, 1 Stat. 137-138
(allowing private individual to sue for, and receive half of goods forfeited for, unlicensed
trading with Indian tribes); Act of Mar. 3, 1791, ch. 15, § 44, 1 Stat. 209 (allowing person
who discovers violation of spirits duties, or officer who seizes contraband spirits, to sue
for and receive half of penalty and forfeiture, along with costs, in action of debt); cf. Act of
Apr. 30, 1790, ch. 9, §§ 16, 17, 1 Stat. 116 (allowing informer to conduct prosecution, and
receive half of fine, for criminal larceny or receipt of stolen goods)”).
81.
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S.
765, 777-78 (2000).
82.
31 U.S.C § 3730(e)(4)(A)-(B) (2006) (emphasis added), amended by Pub. L. No.
111-148, 124 Stat. 119 § 10104 (j)(2)(4)(A)).
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makes entirely optional, at the government’s instance, the conditions that have
traditionally barred a claim on the grounds that the relator is not the original
source of information already publicly disclosed.
In other words, one
of the bases upon which the Stevens Court found Article III standing in an
FCA claim—that it is an informer statute, of the type which has been afforded
standing throughout Anglo-American history—is not applicable to actions
brought under a statute that is no longer, in fact, an informer statute.83 The
revised FCA does not require that a relator either provide information or suffer
the dismissal of his action—as will be the case whenever the government
objects to the workings of the public disclosure bar in the FCA. This need
not always be so, as in instances when the government does not choose to
intervene. Nevertheless, the change makes the FCA, at best, only a “quasiinformer” statute. To emphasize this point by way of its effect, when a petitioner
who would have been barred jurisdictionally is not in fact barred, the statute
rewards a repeater of information, not a provider of it.84
In short, the government veto over the public disclosure bar turns any
plaintiff whose FCA action has been saved from dismissal into a private
attorney general, a bounty hunter whose investment in the outcome is his only
tie to the disposition of the matter. And as Justice Scalia stated in Stevens, a
party’s interest in the recovery that might be won is no different from that of
one who has placed a wager upon the outcome.85 Neither is a basis for Article
III standing.86 Indeed, the PPACA amendment to the FCA is precedent for any
claimant—either with the most tenuous ties to the subject matter or with none
at all—to claim that his willingness to finance an action permits him a right to
bring a suit, as long as the government consents.87
The second argument by the Court in Stevens for finding constitutional
standing set out in Stevens—that the relator acts as an “assignee” of the United
States—is also affected by PPACA.88 While the Court’s opinion anticipated
circumstances in which the government allows all qui tam relators to be
assignees, it did not anticipate circumstances in which the assignment is made
through a member of the Department of Justice (DOJ), and is then passed on—
at the DOJ’s sole discretion—to a qui tam plaintiff chosen by way of unstated,
unspecified criteria. A situation in which DOJ members could select assignees
according to unstated procedures was not a scenario before the Court when it
considered Stevens.89

83.
See supra pp. 13–16.
84.
See supra pp. 13–17.
85.
Stevens at 772-774.
86.
See supra pp. 13–17.
87.
See supra pp. 13–17.
88.
Vermont Agency of Natural Resources v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S.
765, 774–75 (2000).
89.
See supra pp. 13–16.
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Therefore, both arguments for Article III standing in FCA qui tam actions
have been compromised and are subject to challenge in a post-PPACA
landscape.
V.

ARTICLE II APPOINTMENTS CLAUSE

The new constitutional concerns raised by the PPACA amendment based on
the Appointments Clause follow closely from the concerns related to Article III
standing discussed in the immediately preceding section. For the government
veto not only changes the nature of the FCA from an informer statute into
a private attorney general statute, but also vests the power by which the
transformation takes place solely in the DOJ.90 According to the language of
the amendment, that power is exercised at its sole discretion.91 In other words,
standing may “spring” based upon governmental fiat. Consequently, problems
arise with regard to both the separation of powers doctrine and the doctrine of
non-delegable duties.92
Article II of the Constitution states that the President:
“[S]hall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the
Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, Judges of the [S]upreme [C]ourt, and all other Officers
of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise
provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress
may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they
think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the
Heads of Departments.”
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 .
The constitutional argument against qui tam actions based on this clause
stems from the fact that relators are not nominated by the President and are not
approved by the Senate.93

90.
See William B. Rubenstein, On What a “Private Attorney General” Is—And Why
it Matters, 57 VAND. L. REV. 2129, 2145–46 (2004).
91.
31 U.S.C § 3730(e)(4)(A)-(B) (2010), amended by Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat.
119 § 10104 (j)(2)(4)(A)).
92.
See infra pp. 19–20.
93.
See Blanch, supra note 21, at 737–38. But see, Caminker, supra note 65, at 374–
80.
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For a time, it was argued that in the FCA, Congress had aggrandized its
powers at the expense of the Executive.94 This was arguably a violation of the
rule established in Buckley v. Valeo.95 Although the Federal District Courts
were not responsive to the suggestion that Congress had increased its powers
through the enactment of the FCA,96 this argument is not the only critical
approach parties have taken based on the clause.
In Freytag v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,97 the petitioners contended
that a statute allowing the Chief Judge of the United States Tax Court to
appoint special trial judges was in violation of the Appointments Clause.98 The
petitioner claimed that a special trial judge is an “inferior Office[r]” that has to
be appointed by the Executive and does not fall within one of the Constitution’s
three repositories of the appointment power: the President, the courts of law,
or the heads of departments.99 The Court held that the Appointments Clause
could be violated not only by Congress’ arrogation of powers, but also by its
diffusion of powers:100
The Appointments Clause prevents Congress from dispensing
power too freely, as it limits the universe of eligible recipients
of the power to appoint. Because it articulates a limiting
principle, the Appointments Clause does not always serve
the Executive’s interests. For example, the Clause forbids
Congress to grant the appointment power to inappropriate
members of the Executive Branch. Neither Congress nor the
Executive can agree to waive this structural protection. ‘The
assent of the Executive to a bill which contains a provision
contrary to the Constitution does not shield it from judicial
review.’101

94.
See, e.g., Ryder v. U.S., 515 U.S. 177 (1995).
95.
424 U.S. 1, 1 (1976).
96.
E.g. United States ex rel. Stillwell v. Hughes Helicopters, Inc., 714 F. Supp. 1084,
1094 (C.D. Cal.1989).
97.
501 U.S. 868, 877–78 (1991).
98.
Id.
99.
Id.
100. Id.
101. Id. (citing INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 942 (1983)) (“The assent of the Executive
to a bill which contains a provision contrary to the Constitution does not shield it from
judicial review”).
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The Court went on to hold that a “tax court” is a “Court of Law” in the sense
contemplated by Article III.102 Still, the rationale regarding diffusion of powers
speaks directly to the PPACA amendments to the FCA.103 As stated above, in
the amended FCA, Congress has delegated to the DOJ, at its fiat, the ability to
create standing—or not—using criteria unstated in the statute.104
In addition, one of the permissible repositories of appointment power,
“Heads of Departments,” has been interpreted to mean the Secretary of
Labor,105 the Chief Justice of the Tax Court,106 and cabinet members, not
“mere bureau heads.”107 Whether a multitude of district attorneys in charge
of the government’s interests in an array of FCA actions can be construed as
synonymous with “Heads of Departments” has yet to be determined.
Furthermore, even if Congress has the power to confer such standing, and
even if it could allow the Executive branch to exercise the kind of authority
that the amended FCA provides, Congress has delegated this standing-creating
power without providing an intelligible principle to guide the Department of
Justice’s actions.108
In Mistretta v. United States,109 the Supreme Court permitted the delegation
of Congressional power, but only up to a point.110 The Court said: “so long as
Congress ‘shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which
the person or body authorized to [exercise the delegated authority] is directed
to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative
power.’”111
However, in the amended FCA, it is not simply a matter of no intelligible
standard provided to the DOJ for applying its veto over the public disclosure
bar, there is no standard provided whatsoever. Justice Scalia’s dissent in
Mistretta speaks even more forcefully to this current set of circumstances than
it did to the case before the Court in 1989:

102. 501 U.S. 868, 891–93 (1991).
103. See supra pp. 10–12.
104. See supra pp. 10–17.
105. See Varnadore v. Sec’y of Labor, 141 F.3d 625, 631 (6th Cir. 1998).
106. See Samuels, Kramer & Co. v. Comm’r of Internal Rev., 930 F.2d 975, 993–94
(2d Cir. 1991).
107. See Brooks v. U.S., 33 F. Supp. 68, 69 (E.D.N.Y. 1939); see also Surowitz v. U.S.,
80 F. Supp. 716, 719 (S.D.N.Y. 1948) (considering whether a war department attorney
prosecuting war crimes is an “inferior officer” under Article II).
108. See supra pp.10–17.
109. 488 U.S. 361, 372 (1989).
110. Id.
111. Id. at 372 (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. U.S., 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928)).
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As John Locke [stated] almost 300 years ago, ’[t]he power of the
legislative being derived from the people by a positive voluntary
grant and institution, can be no other, than what the positive grant
conveyed, which being only to make laws, and not to make legislators,
the legislative can have no power to transfer their authority of making
laws, and place it in other hands.’ J. Locke, Second Treatise of
Government 87 (R. Cox ed.1982) (emphasis added) . . . Or as we
have less epigrammatically said: ‘[t]hat Congress cannot delegate
legislative power to the President is a principle universally recognized
as vital to the integrity and maintenance of the system of government
ordained by the Constitution.’ Marshall Field & Co. v. Clark, 143
U.S. 649, 692 (1892) (emphasis added).
Mistretta v. U.S., 488 U.S. 361, 419–20 (1988).
Whatever criteria the DOJ were to use in determining when to apply the
veto would arguably be legislative in nature, and therefore in violation of the
Appointments Clause under Article II.
VI.

ARTICLE II “TAKE CARE” CLAUSE

The third argument traditionally leveled at the constitutionality of qui
tam actions is also based on the separation of powers doctrine.112 In Article
II, the Constitution requires that the President “shall take Care that the laws
[are] faithfully executed.”113 The argument has been that a relator’s semiprosecutorial action on behalf of the government takes away the Executive’s
branch’s control over the litigation, which is in violation of the separation of
powers doctrine.114

112. Each of the three arguments is a different aspect of one “separation of powers”
argument, says James T. Blanch. See Blanch, supra note 21, at 747–50. The Lujan Court
correlated the standing and the Take Care arguments: “[i]f the [standing doctrine’s] concrete
injury requirement has the separation-of-powers significance we have always said, the
answer must be obvious: To permit Congress to convert the undifferentiated public interest
in executive officers’ compliance with the law into an ’individual right’ vindicable [sic]
in the courts is to permit Congress to transfer from the President to the courts the Chief
Executive’s most important constitutional duty, to take Care that the Laws be faithfully
executed.” Art. II, § 3. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992).
113. U.S. CONST.. art. II, § 3.
114. See, e.g., Caminker, supra note 65, at 356 (citing Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S.
821, 832 (1985); Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976)).
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Of the three different arguments, this line of criticism seems to have been
somewhat attenuated by the PPACA, in that the government veto gives the
DOJ a new level of control—albeit mysterious in its criteria—at least insofar
as the workings of the public disclosure bar are concerned.115 This means that
the government now has the power to decide when to allow a suit and when
not to allow it.
However, the indeterminate nature of this application is itself problematic.
As stated above, the PPACA has created: 1) the new Article III standing
problem based on the changed nature of the FCA from an informer statute
to a private attorney general statute; and 2) the new Article II Appointments
Clause problem based on the separation of powers and non-delegable duties
doctrines.116 When taken in conjunction with these two issues, a decision
allowing an action to proceed by means of unstated criteria, written and
applied not by Congress, but by the DOJ, is arguably an abdication of the
government’s duty to take care that the laws are faithfully executed.
This is similar to the rationale employed in Freytag, which found that
Congress could violate the Appointments Clause not only by arrogation of
its powers, but also by diffusion of them.117 Here the argument proceeds that
the Executive is diffusing, and obfuscating, its powers in favor of a private
individual whose only stake in the suit is in the possible recovery he may
enjoy.118 In this scenario, the specter of the undeserving parasitic plaintiff
returns, but alongside him is a complicit Executive branch.
VII.

POLICY PROBLEMS

In addition to the constitutional problems raised by the PPACA amendments
to the FCA, new policy concerns also arise. The impact of the government veto
over the public disclosure bar will likely affect the kinds of plaintiffs attracted
to the actions, the FCA’s first-to file bar, the amount of recoveries received, and
the judicial resources spent. Notions of equity and professional propriety are
likely to occur as well.

115. See 31 U.S.C § 3730(e)(4)(A)–(B) (2011), amended by Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 § 10104 (j)(2)(4)(A)); supra pp.10–11 (describing PPACA’s alterations to the
FCA statute, including the addition of language that provides for a government veto of a
court dismissal).
116. See supra pp. 12–19.
117. 501 U.S. 868, 877–78 (1991). See supra pp.17–18.
118. Id.
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A. Parasitic Actions
Since the institution of informer statutes, the public disclosure arena has
been plagued with what former Attorney General Biddle called “parasitic
actions.”119 In these cases, the plaintiff has made no contribution of information
and performs no purpose except to fund the expenses of the lawsuit in the
event that the government does not intervene.120
Obviously, the notion behind informer statutes is that otherwise undetectable
fraud will be brought to light by those closest to its connivance—whether a
confederate to the scheme or an innocent witness.121 However, a case in which
the plaintiff brings no new information to the government frustrates the entire
enterprise.122 In the worst cases, such plaintiffs perpetrate their own type of
fraud in the pursuit of fraudulent perpetrators, demanding a bounty that they
have not earned.123 Even when the plaintiff earnestly believes he has made a
contribution to the case, the particularities of the public disclosure bar have
excluded his participation in the recovery when he cannot show that he is the
original source of the information.124 As has been argued here, this saves the
informer statute from becoming a repeater’s statute.
Now that the PPACA amendment has made that bar conditional upon the
government’s fiat, the likelihood of parasitic actions equivalent to the pre-1943
state of affairs—the very type of action outlined in Attorney General Biddle’s
letter to Congress—has increased.125 The only thing stopping such a turn of
events is the government’s refusal to exercise the veto, but how and when and
why that should occur is an open question.126

119. S. Rept. No. 77-1708, at 2; H. Rept. No. 78-263 at 2. See also Beck, supra note 1.
120. Id.
121. See Beck, supra note 1, at 565-74.
122. See supra pp. 5–7.
123. See supra p. 10.
124. See supra p. 10.
125. See Cohen, supra note 5.
126. An interesting type of abuse to which informer statutes were prone in the past was
the possibility of collusion between an “informer” who was friendly to the defendant. By
bringing a useless action at the instance of the defendant, the informer could be rewarded
by his confederate after the suit was dismissed. Beck, supra note 1, at 574. As stated
above, Justice Jackson feared the problem arising again when the relator had no ties to the
information of the suit. Id. This is yet another example of how creative abuses may become
when there is no effective means by which to screen out parasitic plaintiffs.
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B. Incentives and Disincentives
Another consequence, however unintended, of the new government veto
relates to the whistleblower’s incentive to come forward with real information—
that is, useful news of fraud. Under the FCA, “[w]hen a person brings an action
under this subsection, no person other than the Government can intervene or
bring a related action based on the facts underlying the pending action.”127
Since there is no longer an outright bar to suits that would have been
dismissed in the past on the grounds that the relator is not the original source of
disclosed information, the race to the courthouse will likely become fierce.128
That is because a tie to the subject matter is not a definitive prerequisite to
the action. In fact, it might be in the government’s interest to allow the action
to proceed, as in cases where the plaintiff has the financial resources to fund
the suit himself. The government could encourage the “useless” repeater to
file the action. Unfortunately, the true informant, i.e., one with useful news of
fraud, will be barred by the first-to-file bar in section 3730 if he is late to the
filing office and his information overlaps in some respect with the first filer—
resulting in a potential loss of valuable information.129
Perversely, the PPACA government veto amendment to the FCA prejudices
those with real contributions who are not fast enough to the game. This kind of
unseemliness was one of the points in former Attorney General Biddle’s letter
that prompted the 1943 Amendments.130 With the passage of PPACA, the stage
is set for a similar contortion of affairs.
Even the arguments of those who have championed the constitutionality of
qui tam provisions are undone by these policy considerations. For example,
one supportive scholar wrote that the qui tam authorization could not be
successfully replaced by a reward incentive regime:
None of these purposes served by qui tam authorization would
similarly be served by replacing it with a reward incentive regime
authorizing the DOJ to offer informers a monetary reward for
disclosing their knowledge of fraudulent activities if and when the
DOJ successfully litigated an action based on their information.
Congress determined that . . . many potential informers are reluctant
to come forward because they refuse to accept the “personal and
financial risk”. . . . Second, such a reward regime would not utilize
the resources of the private citizenry to supplement the limited public
resources with which the DOJ can enforce the Act. Finally, such a
regime would not discourage executive complacency.131
127. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) (2006).
128. See Cohen, supra note 5.
129. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(b)(5) (2006).
130. S. Rept. No. 77-1708, at 2; H. Rept. No. 78-263 at 2. See also Beck, supra note 1.
131. Caminker, supra note 65, at 352 (finding that a reward incentive regime “would
not discourage executive complacency”).
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But with the effect of the government veto, not only is the sole incentive the
monetary reward, the sole requirement is the willingness to fund the litigation.
To the extent that the executive complacency feared in the quoted passage
exists, it can only be exacerbated by a plethora of qui tam plaintiffs who are
willing to fund the enterprise and use the considerable power of the action,
made even more powerful—especially with its newly enhanced status—to
bring defendants to the settlement table.
In addition, the lack of any standard for applying the government veto of the
public disclosure bar could itself incentivize abuse. This possibility is over and
above the constitutional concerns in the context of the Appointments Clause.132
For without any standard for guidance in its application, the exercise or nonexercise of the veto could be motivated by political concerns. There is nothing
to stop the veto from being employed to save those relators who bring claims
friendly to a particular administration’s goals, neither is there anything to stop
it from being foregone when relators bring claims that are hostile to those
goals. However unintended such a consequence might be, the potential for this
abuse has been introduced along with the vagaries of the amendment.
C. Procedural Concerns
In addition, without guidance as to when a relator is to be definitively barred,
i.e., such as when the defendant has proven that he is not the original source of
publically disclosed information—neither the qui tam plaintiff nor the qui tam
defendant can predict how the action will proceed.133 The FCA plaintiff will
be unsure as to when the veto will be exercised or not, and on what grounds
the government might save his action from dismissal or refuse to do so.134 On
the other hand, when an FCA defendant must continue to litigate an action
that would otherwise have been barred, but was saved by the governmental
veto, he may insist on his right to be informed of the grounds that saved the
action from dismissal despite the proof that he has put forth determining it to
be deserving of such an order.135

132. See supra pp.16–19.
133. See Nathan Sturycz, Comment, The King and I?: An Examination of the Interest
Qui Tam Relators Represent and the Future of False Claims Litigation, 28 ST. LOUIS U.
PUB. L. REV. 459, 475–86 (2009).
134. Id.
135. Id.
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Guidance in this area may be found in the law surrounding the government’s
right to move for dismissal of the action, whether or not it has intervened in
the suit.136 The statute requires that a party whose action is being dismissed
over his objection be “notified by the Government . . . [and be given] an
opportunity for a hearing on the motion.”137 However, the section gives no
guidelines to the court in determining the propriety of the motion to dismiss.138
In United States ex rel. Sequoia Orange Co. v. Baird-Neece Packing Corp.,139
the government sought dismissal of an action into which it had not intervened.
The court, mindful of the Executive’s need for prosecutorial discretion, stated:
Although courts are reluctant to scrutinize prosecutorial charging
decisions, which involve many practical considerations outside
the purview of judicial review, review of a decision to dismiss an
FCA case is limited to determining whether the government has a
legitimate government interest that will be achieved by dismissal,
which is not arbitrary or otherwise illegal. Historically courts have
made such determinations of the lawfulness of executive function
under a rational-basis standard140. . . “The court’s limited review
of the motion to dismiss does not permit the court ‘to infringe on
prosecutorial authority to a degree beyond the bounds established by
Morrison’ and therefore does not violate the separation of powers.”141
The court held that the defendant has the right to seek dismissal, regardless
of its lack of intervention, but that the plaintiff had a right to judicial review
of the motion.142

136. 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(2)(A) (2006).
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. 151 F.3d 1139, 1145 (9th Cir.1998).
140. The Court applied a two-part rational basis standard: 1) whether the challenged
action has a legitimate purpose; and 2) whether there is a reasonable fit between the
governmental purpose and the agency action. Id. See also United States ex rel. Ridenour
v. Kaiser-Hill, Co., 174 F. Supp. 2d 1147 (D. Colo. 2001) (applying the Sequoia test
and holding that the government need not prove conclusively that its interest would be
adversely affected if the motion was not granted).
141. Id. at 1325 (E.D. Cal. 1995) (quoting United States ex rel. Kelly v. Boeing Co., 9
F.3d 743, 757 (9th Cir.1993)).
142. Id. at 1145.
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In contrast, the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals disagreed with Sequoia in
Swift v. United States, holding that the plaintiff was only statutorily entitled to
“a formal opportunity to convince the government not to end the case.”143 The
Sequoia restriction on governmental discretion impacted the government’s
prerogative “to take care that the laws be faithfully executed” under Article II.144
The plaintiff was not entitled to discovery with regard to why the government
moved to dismiss unless it could make a substantial threshold showing.145
Questions raised about the application of the government veto could concern
some of these same matters: whether or not the government must intervene
prior to using the veto, and whether or not the defendant is entitled to any
type of challenge concerning the grounds upon which the government used
its veto—provided they were stated. If the defendant is deemed to have such a
right, the inquiry would likely relate to whether the reasons for using the veto
were “arbitrary or otherwise illegal.” And a court would also have to determine
what type of standard the defendant must meet to be entitled to discovery.
D. Recoveries and Resources
Another troublesome aspect of the newly-amended FCA is its likely
impact on resources and recoveries. First, as has been argued here, one of the
presuppositions to informer statutes is that the petitioner will earn his reward
by providing information.146 The government is willing to forego part of its
recovery—a considerable sum, as reflected by the recent reporting of FCA
settlement hauls—in favor of the relator.147 The logic is that the information
would not have become known were it not for the whistleblower coming
forward, so the share of the recovery is a cost well worth the spending.
But on what grounds does a relator who would ordinarily be barred, but
is not in fact barred because of the government’s use of its veto, deserve
the reward carved out of the recovery? On what grounds is the public to be
so substantially deprived of monies that would ordinarily go back into the
143. 318 F.3d 250, 253 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (referring to Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654
(1988)).
144. Id. at 253. The only exception would be if there was an allegation that fraud was
perpetrated on the court. Id. The court also held that even if the government was required
to intervene prior to its motion for dismissal, the court “could construe the government’s
motion to dismiss as including a motion to intervene.” Id. at 252.
145. Id. at 254 (quoting U.S. v. Armstrong, 517 U.S. 456, 470 (1996) where the
Supreme Court held that the Defendant was not entitled to recovery absent a substantial
threshold of dissimilar treatment from similarly situated parties).
146. See supra pp. 3–10.
147. According to the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, approximately $3 billion in civil
False Claims Act settlements were recovered in fiscal year 2010, and $2.5 billion were in
health care fraud recoveries. That is the largest health care fraud recovery in history for a
fiscal year. The total of recoveries since 1986 is estimated at 26 billion. UNITED STATED
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE RECOVERS $3 BILLION IN FALSE
CLAIMS CASES IN FISCAL YEAR 2010 (November 22, 2010), http://www.justice.gov/opa/
pr/2010/November/10-civ-1335.html.
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treasury?148 In the case of the parasitic plaintiff, the argument can be made that
he has risked his own personal resources and deserves some of the recovery,
but the constitutional objections raised above challenge his right to participate
at all. The workings of the veto can make the government complicit in its own
deprivation of an earned recovery—funds that belong to the U.S. taxpayer, not
to a particular individual who has decided to underwrite an action.
Another concern arises with regard to judicial resources. With the power
of the government veto, the courts will be required to hear suits that would
ordinarily be barred.149 What the Department of Justice saves in resources by
allowing a suit to proceed at the petitioner’s expense (when that petitioner
would have ordinarily been barred), the courts will have to spend in hearing
cases that would otherwise have to be brought by the government or not at all.
This is an unquantifiable cost.
Settlements are more likely as well, not necessarily because a defendant has
no case, but because the exposure to prolonged litigation is increased by way
of the government veto of the public disclosure bar.150 In this way, increased
power rests in the hands of the qui tam relator who has brought nothing to the
case except his enthusiasm to finance it. And since the defendant cannot know
when the government will intervene to save a suit that would have otherwise
been barred in the past, the defendant must raise and prove the affirmative
defense of the Public Disclosure Bar. Only after that expense is paid will the
defendant know if it was futile.
A great deal of the cost of the public disclosure bar defense will of course
depend on when the veto is exercised. Presumably, the government veto must
be exercised sometime after the pleadings stage but prior to judgment on the
application of the bar. Although the most thorough study of what it costs to

148. A recovery made by the government must be deposited into the treasury as per the
Miscellaneous Receipts Act. 31 U.S.C. § 3302(b). See U.S. v. Northrop Corp., 59 F.3d 953,
968 (9th Cir. 1995) (stating that “relator’s right to recovery exists solely as a mechanism
for deterring fraud and returning funds to the federal treasury”); United States ex rel. Kelly
v. Boeing Co., 9 F.3d 743, 760 (9th Cir.1993) (stating that FCA is meant to remedy harms
done to the U.S. treasury).
149. See 31 U.S.C § 3730(e)(4)(A)–(B) (2006), amended by Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 § 10104 (j)(2)(4)(A) (2011)); supra pp.10–11 (describing PPACA’s alterations to
the FCA statute, including the addition of language that provides for a government veto of
a court dismissal).
150. See 31 U.S.C § 3730(e)(4)(A)–(B) (2006), amended by Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124
Stat. 119 § 10104 (j)(2)(4)(A) (2011)); supra pp.10–11 (describing PPACA’s alterations to
the FCA statute, including the addition of language that provides for a government veto of
a court dismissal).
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defend an FCA action is more than twenty years old, the figures amount to a
heavy toll, particularly when the government has not intervened. 151
In a survey of defense contractors conducted in the early 1990s, out-ofpocket legal costs ranged from $250,000 to $500,000 in the simplest of cases,
when there was no parallel criminal inquiry taking place and the time frame for
the litigation was short.152 In more intricate cases, the figures rose to between
$1,000,000 and $10,000,000.153 In neither scenario do these figures take into
account any internal costs incurred by the defendant in responding to the
allegations. When the government did not intervene, the costs were particularly
alarming relative to the recovery.
Out-of-pocket defense costs greatly exceed recoveries to the government
in such matters.154 The survey participants were defendants in thirty-eight
FCA suits in which: (a) a relator initiated the case; (b) the DOJ declined to
participate; and (c) the matter had been disposed of either by a settlement or by
a decision of a court.155 To defend themselves in these thirty-eight completed
matters, the survey respondents spent approximately $53,403,000 on external
legal costs.156 The total amount of FCA recoveries obtained in these matters
Average expenditure in outside legal fees by defendants in these cases was
$1,431,660, and the average FCA recovery was $97,223.157
Judging by these twenty year-old figures, the new powers of the FCA relator,
especially now that the government veto may prolong a case that would have
been jurisdictionally barred prior to passage of the PPACA amendments, are
likely to make the costs to defend these suits worthy of another study.
E. Equitable and Professional Concerns
Even more policy concerns arise—or resurrect, as the case may be—with
regard to equitable and professional objections to qui tam actions.
Other types of plaintiffs who act on behalf of the public at large must go
through qualification procedures. For instance, in order for a class action

151. See William E. Kovacic, The Civil False Claims Act as a Deterrent to Participation
in Government Procurement Markets, 6 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 201 (1998). The study that
was the subject of the Kovacic article was conducted by COOPERS & LYBRAND and THE
ANALYTICAL SCIENCES CORPORATION. Ten defense suppliers were surveyed as part of
commission to determine the regulatory premium associated with existing procurement
policies. Id. at 223. See also Daniel C. Lumm, The 2009 ‘Clarifications’ to the False
Claims Act Of 1863: The All-Purpose Antifraud Statute with the Fun Qui Tam Twist, 45
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 527 (2010).
152. Kovacic, supra note 151, at 225.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 226.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
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plaintiff to be appointed lead plaintiff, he must meet a distinct set of criteria.158
This is a process required even of a party who can claim injury in fact, entitling
him Article III standing as a matter of right.159 With regard to securities actions
under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995,160 the Plaintiff’s
appointment largely hinges upon how great that injury has been relative to
the class itself—so, in effect, the party with the greatest claim to standing
in terms of the “injury in fact” requirement. In addition, he must prove his
commitment to the action and that his interests are aligned with those of the
other plaintiffs.161
More generally speaking, no class action can proceed until the class is
defined, which requires that members must join the class within a certain time
frame.162 This ensures that every member plaintiff in the class show injury in
fact, not just prospective injury. In other words, the requirement guarantees an
immediacy with relation to the injury that resonates with the Article II standing
requirement for actual, not conjectural, harm.163 The portrait of the class action
member plaintiff in general, let alone the lead plaintiff, can be characterized as
a party with “standing plus.”164
In contrast, with regard to the qui tam relator whose suit has been saved by
way of the government veto, there are practically no qualifications at all to his
status.165 On top of a lack of injury in fact, the ties to the subject matter of the
suit are no longer a qualifying pre-requisite, and the relator may proceed—
when the government consents—regardless of that fact.166 In this way, although
she is ostensibly acting on behalf of the public—having blown the whistle on
fraud—she may well have done nothing of the kind. The requirements that
plaintiffs in other actions must go through are not applied at all in the qui tam
action. The tenuousness of standing in these circumstances shows in greater
relief when put in contrast with the standing of the class action plaintiff. And
the difference is not only between the qui tam relator and class action plaintiffs;

158. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(a)(4) states that “one or more members of a class may sue or
be sued as representative parties on behalf of all members only if the representative parties
will fairly and adequately protect the interests of the class.”
159. Id.
160. See 15 U.S.C. § 78-u4 (2006).
161. See Tanne v. Autobytel, Inc. 226 F.R.D. 659 (C.D. Cal., 2005) (setting out factors
used to determine lead plaintiff in class action suit).
162. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(c)(1)(B).
163. See Lujan v. Def. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).
164. Id.
165. See supra pp. 23–25.
166. See supra pp. 23–25.
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a similar contrast exists between FCA qui tam relators and antitrust litigants,167
as well as RICO plaintiffs suing under a private right of action.168
Finally, a troublesome professional concern may also arise. One of the
earliest forms of abuse was by way of lawyers seeking to piggyback actions
onto information that had already been made public.169 Without a means to
screen out such parasitic actions by way of a conclusive, rather than an openended, public disclosure bar, the professional bounty hunter lawyer could
return from the precincts to which he has been banished in this country for
nearly seventy years. A client with some relationship to the suit might be
sought, one who can finance the suit for the chance at a recovery that will be
all the more likely to come about through settlement, especially now that the
ties to the subject matter need not be dispositive of the right to bring the action.
Direct attorney involvement in the whistleblowing area is not uncommon.170
CONCLUSION
The five word alteration to the FCA wrought by PPACA has issued in a new
set of concerns with regard to the constitutionality of FCA. These concerns
have lain on a quieter plain for many years. The constitutionality of the FCA,
which had at least won approval from the Supreme Court on the issue of
standing, is now compromised, not only on the standing question, but also
with regard to the Appointments Clause and Take Care Clause. Finally, the
policy concerns that are likely to follow only heighten the debate that will
unfold in the future.

167. See Joseph F. Brodley, Antitrust Standing in Private Merger Cases: Reconciling
Private Incentives and Public Enforcement Goals, 94 MICH. L. REV. 1, 16 (1995)
(explaining standing of antitrust litigants); Dayna Bowen Matthew, The Moral Hazard
Problem with Privatization of Public Enforcement: the Case of Pharmaceutical Fraud, 40
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 281, 331(2007)(contrasting qui tam relators and various other types
of plaintiffs
168. See 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (2006).
169. See, e.g., U.S. v. Burmah Oil Co., Ltd., 558 F.2d 43, 46 & n.1 (2d Cir. 1977).
170. See Fair Laboratory Practices Assoc. v. Quest Diagnostics, Inc., S.D.N.Y. No.
05 Civ. 5393 (RPP) (Apr. 5, 2011) (dismissing an FCA action brought by a former general
counsel of the defendant, reasoning that the ethical duties to an attorney’s clients were held
to trump all FCA concerns).

